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The place of Richard Dedekind in the history of logicism is a controversial matter. From the 
point of view of contemporary philosophy of mathematics, what is of interest is Dedekind’s 
contribution to the emergence of the modern mathematical style (axiomatic and structural 
analysis, set theory and foundations) and no doubt also his peculiar brand of structuralism 
understood as a philosophical position. The conception of logic incorporated in his work is 
certainly old-fashioned, in spite of innovative elements that would play an important role in late 
19th and early 20th century discussions. Yet his understanding of logic and logicism remains of 
interest for the light it throws upon the development of modern logic in general, and logicistic 
views of the foundations of mathematics in particular. Concentration upon one or two “key 
figures” is not the best strategy for intellectual understanding: often we gain deeper 
understanding from paying attention to lesser known authors and their work sheds much light 
on that of the “key figures”. 
 In a series of articles I have defended that one must distinguish two phases in the 
development of logicism up to the 1930s:2 an early, triumphant phase from 1872 to the shocking 
discovery of the contradictions in the years 1897–1903, and a later phase of reconstruction 
where of course Russellian logicism based upon the theory of types was the main exponent. The 
1890s was a crucial decade of explosive diffusion for this viewpoint, which found adherents in 
all the countries that represented mathematical powers – Germany, where the young Hilbert was 
among them, England, France, and Italy. The evidence suggests that German authors were the 
prime movers of this tendency, and I have defended the controversial claim that, as of 1900, 
Dedekind was still a more central reference in this respect than Frege. (The claim is of course 
linked with the fact that Frege did not enjoy a powerful reception before Russell, and also the 
Göttingen people – Hilbert, Zermelo – started to call attention to him from about 1903.) 
 Logicism defends two key theses, the conceptual thesis that the basic concepts of 
mathematics can be reduced to logical concepts alone, and the doctrinal thesis that the basic 
principles of mathematics can be derived from logical principles. Such was exactly Dedekind’s 
standpoint. In his view, all of pure mathematics can be “divest[ed] … of [its] specifically 
arithmetic character” so as to be “subsumed under more general notions and under activities of 
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the understanding without which no thinking is possible at all.” And the universal logical 
principles governing such notions are such that “with [them] a foundation is provided for the 
reliability and completeness of proofs”.3 Indeed Dedekind succeeded in outlining a reduction the 
number system, algebra, and analysis to sets and mappings alone. Thus all of pure mathematics 
was proved to be an outgrowth of the pure laws of logic (modulo his conception of logic). 
 My claim that Dedekind must be seriously regarded as a logicist has always elicited skeptical 
eyebrows. Everybody accepts that he was a highly respected mathematician by 1890, and that 
he made most relevant contributions to the foundations of mathematics. But our understanding 
of “logic” is too strongly shaped by 20th century formal logic, and our conception of logicism is 
stamped by the mark of Frege and Russell.4  Notice that Russell was not merely a prominent 
logician and logicist: through his prolific writing and influence as a philosopher, he established 
a standard interpretation of the recent history of logic; Frege and Peano played a key role in this 
interpretation, while authors such as Dedekind and Schröder were sidestepped.5  
 Placing Dedekind centre stage is perhaps difficult, since it requires us to show considerable 
flexibility in our conceptual reconstruction of the convoluted history of logical theory – of the 
very notion of logic. In my case, perhaps this was made easier by the fact that early on I was 
sufficiently perplexed by issues in the philosophy of logic, and very especially by the 
conflicting, often irreconcilable claims about logic that one can find in Frege, Wittgenstein, 
Russell, Carnap, and others. Let me insist that understanding Dedekind does pay off, among 
other things because it alerts us to the peculiarities of logical theory before 1928, and to the 
peculiarities of logicism before 1910 or even 1928. 
 We have gathered considerable evidence of a very positive reception for Dedekind’s 
proposals in the 1890s. Ernst Schröder adopted the logicist viewpoint in explicit reference to 
Dedekind, and so did Hilbert in his lectures of the 1890s, all the way up to the Grundlagen der 
Geometrie. Among those less inclined to the logicist thesis, Peano’s enthusiasm for Dedekind’s 
work was evidenced in his publications from 1889, and Peirce remarked on the fuzzy borders 
between logic and mathematics with a reference to him (characteristically for the 1890s, no 
reference to Frege).6 The relevance accorded to Dedekind’s work by Frege can be measured 
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from the fact that he discussed it both in the Preface and the Introduction to Grundgesetze der 
Arithmetik, his masterpiece (Frege 1893); the criticisms he expressed there are sharp, as usual, 
and off the mark in some cases. Lastly, perhaps it is relevant that Russell read Dedekind’s work 
some years before reading Frege or even Peano.  
 Certainly the time was ripe for the serious proposal that pure mathematics is but a form of 
highly developed logic – “one of the greatest discoveries of our age”, said Russell (1903, p. 5), 
according to whom this thesis was “very recent among mathematicians, and is almost 
universally denied by philosophers” (1903, xv). But my claim that Dedekind must be seriously 
regarded as a logicist still elicits skeptical eyebrows and critical responses. This piece is an 
attempt to clarify the matter by answering key criticisms and adding some more details.7  
 
I:   Dedekind and Mathematical Logic. 
It is often written or thought that Dedekind’s does not qualify as a reasonable form of logicism, 
because he did not develop a full system of formal logic. This in my view is the most relevant 
objection. Thus, Marcus Giaquinto in his recent philosophical account writes that Dedekind “did 
not have in mind any positive conception of logic”.8 But I shall argue for the opposite. 
 Frege (1893, pp. 2-3) complained that the basic principles on which Dedekind’s work was 
based had nowhere been explicitly stated and that, in the absence of explicit formal derivations, 
it was impossible to check what exactly those principles were. He also said that Dedekind was 
able to cover a lot of ground only because none of his proofs was more than a sketch. This 
cannot be denied once we accept Frege’s criteria and his new notion of a formal proof, and yet 
all other contemporaries judged it exactly in the opposite way: most of them (even Cantor) saw 
no need to devote so much space to explicit deduction of “obvious” results, and they had little or 
no understanding for Dedekind’s painstaking way of following a strictly deductive paradigm. 
 Dedekind only entered into details concerning logic, its basic concepts, and its principles, to 
the limited extent he felt indispensable for the purpose at hand in Was sind und was sollen die 
Zahlen? (1888) – namely, to establish a foundation for the arithmetic of natural numbers and its 
extension up to the complex numbers. This limited purpose meant in particular that he did not 
need to discuss the elementary parts of logic having to do with propositional connectives and 
quantifiers; to be sure, he uses this logic in a clear way, but he does not theorize on it. However, 
as I have argued at length elsewhere, it should be obvious that what is of great relevance for 
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of logicism in the 1890s. 
8 Giaquinto (2002), 30. But see the more careful, and historically more truthful, appraisal of the 
situation in p. 33. 
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logicism is not the elementary layers of logical theory, but rather the higher levels. That part of 
logic which is essential for logicism is the upper layers that must bear the weight of reducing 
mathematical concepts and propositions. 
 These upper layers concerned the theory of sets and mappings, resp., classes and relations in 
Russell’s terminology. From the now remote perspective of the 1900s, Russell stated (1903, 11) 
that logic consists of three parts, the theory of propositions, the theory of classes, and the theory 
of relations. Dedekind’s logicism was based on the latter two, and he contributed in important 
ways to developing them and laying out their foundations.  
 Some people are puzzled to find that the concepts of set and mapping were simply regarded 
as logical ones. With regards to the concept of set, this was a usual view in the late 19th century, 
well represented for instance with Boole, Schröder, Peano, and Russell. Logic was taken to deal 
centrally with concepts, and sets or classes were extensions of concepts; the theory of sets or 
classes was simply a formal theory of concepts, a part of formal logic. There is ample evidence 
that Dedekind regarded the theory of sets as logic from at least 1872, and later in his life he 
would still speak of the “logical theory of sets” (Systemlehre der Logik)9. 
 As for the concept of mapping, Dedekind argued that it was indeed indispensable to all 
thought, expressing as it does “the ability of the mind to relate things to things, to make a thing 
correspond to another, or to represent a thing by another” (Dedekind 1888, 335–336). He seems 
to have been thinking of the relations between word and object, between proposition and state of 
affairs, but also between an algebraic equation and a geometric figure. As he stressed, this 
notion of a map is likewise “absolutely indispensable” for arithmetic and pure mathematics, as 
witnessed by the role of functions, isomorphisms, but even at the most elementary level the role 
of the successor mapping.10 Writers as influential as Schröder, Peirce, or Hilbert agreed, though 
the logicians expressed a clear preference to reconsider Dedekind’s mappings within a general 
theory of relations.11 
 Even Frege acknowledged the parallelism between Dedekind’s system and his own: his 
discussion of Dedekind’s work aims to establish that sets must be replaced by concepts and 
concept-extensions, while maps have to be replaced by relations. He writes: 
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(see p. 112) – this confirms that he did not aim to be complete in Dedekind (1888).  
10 At the same time, somewhat mysteriously, Dedekind claimed that the whole science of arithmetic 
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the natural interpretation is that he thought it possible to reduce sets to maps (indeed it is, see e.g. von 
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important objectives” of his work (ibid p. 346; see chapters 9 and 12).  
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The same holds for the word “correlation” [Zuordnung] as for the word “set”. Both are now used 
widely in mathematics, yet a deeper insight into what they are really intended to mean is largely 
absent. If I am right in thinking that arithmetic is a branch of pure logic, then a purely logical 
expression must be chosen for “correlation”. I take the word “relation”. Concept and relation are 
the foundation stones upon which I erect my edifice. (Frege 1893, 3).12  
Notice how, perhaps unwillingly, Frege is underscoring the parallelisms (extension of) concept 
≡ set, (univocal)13 relation ≡ mapping. (Although he speaks of “correlation” and not “mapping”, 
both the context and §38 of Grundgesetze, where he defines “mapping” basically in Dedekind’s 
sense, indicate that my reading is adequate.) Notice also that the connectives and quantifiers are 
not even mentioned, so that Frege offers support to my view that the upper layers of logical 
theory is the essential part for logicism.  
 Dedekind chose not to present his system by axioms, since for him – in good Kantian 
tradition – the word “axiom” connoted a non-logical principle (see Ferreirós 1999, 247-248), 
but he took pains to state as immediate consequences of basic logical notions, or else to prove, 
all of the propositions needed. 
 Benis-Sinaceur (2008) has written that Dedekind regarded logic as “le moyen de la rigueur, 
non la base des mathématiques”, the means of rigor and not the basis of mathematics. But this 
interpretation seems hardly compatible with Dedekind’s work, especially with his statements. 
He emphasized that all mathematics has the notions of set and map as its basis, and he stressed 
that these notions are purely logical. In accordance, he wrote that arithmetic, algebra, and 
analysis are only a part of logic (Dedekind 1888, 335, Preface). It can be said louder and at 
greater length, but not clearer. And let me stress it again: this was not an idiosyncratic vision of 
Dedekind’s, but rather in agreement with the most relevant mathematical logicians of the 1890s 
(excepting Frege insofar as he objected to the extensional approach to logic). 
 Benis-Sinaceur has also stated that Dedekind understood logic in a rather vague sense, 
“antérieur aux précisions apportées par la logique mathématique,” but in my view this also 
needs to be qualified. Dedekind’s understanding of logic may be judged vague, especially since 
he acted as a mathematician, not a philosopher, spending no ink in an explanation of some of 
the basic tenets of his conception. And certainly he was influenced by traditional (formal) logic, 
as I have tried to make explicit in (Ferreirós 1996). But he relied on the precisions proposed by 
mathematical logicians, and he went on to propose precisions of his own. His understanding of 
the theory of classes was basically in agreement with Boolean logic, as shown e.g. by the fact 
that he discussed union and intersection as the key operations.  
                                                       
12 Translation by Beaney (The Frege Reader, p. 210). The extent to which Frege’s criticism is 
inadequate should become more and more clear in the sequel; see also Tait (1996). 
13 By “univocal” I mean an eindeutige Zuordnung, many-one – a functional relation. 
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 Dedekind had an active interest in the new logical calculi, as shown by the story of his 
interest in Schröder’s work. The manuscript of Zahlen, drafted in the 1870s, contains several 
references to Schröder’s 1877 book Der Operationskreis des Logikkalküls (The circle of 
operations of the logical calculus), a systematic exposition of Boolean logic. In section 1 of 
Zahlen (1888) he did not develop the Boolean calculus, but this was simply because it played no 
essential part in his reduction of arithmetic to logic. At the same time, Dedekind was more clear 
and explicit than previous logicians on key points such as the objecthood of sets and the 
principle of extensionality for sets. Later in the 1890s Dedekind became very interested in 
Schröder’s Vorlesungen, which he studied carefully, and which even inspired him to do most 
significant work on the theory of lattices. 
 More original, of course, was his work on mappings. At the time, the theory of relations was 
a hot topic among the pioneers of mathematical logic, but its connections with advanced 
mathematics via functional relations had not been underscored, let alone analyzed in detail. 
Little wonder that Schröder was left in admiration of the “epoch-making” contribution made by 
Dedekind, given the difficulty of the advances he introduced into the calculus of logic in order 
to establish conclusively its connection with arithmetic (Schröder 1895, 346-352). The 
exposition of mapping theory in section 2 of (1888) is certainly a model, as seen e.g. by the 
treatment of the composition of maps;14 also very neat and mature is the treatment of 
equipollence as an equivalence relation. But the theory of chains is just wonderful, in effect the 
most original and profound theoretical development in Dedekind’s booklet. The concept of 
chain of a subset A ⊂ S under a map ϕ: S → S was obtained by analyzing and generalizing the 
conditions that an internal mapping must satisfy in order to make proofs by induction possible 
and conclusive. As for its reach, let me remind you that in 1887 Dedekind was able to use this 
theory to prove the Cantor-Bernstein theorem; in the booklet he preferred to leave a (somewhat 
generalized) version of the crucial lemma as an exercise for readers.15 
 All of the above means that, without in the least denying the great contribution made by 
Frege (1879; 1893) with his analysis and formalization of elementary logic, especially 
quantification theory, we can regard Dedekind’s as a perfectly reasonable form of logicism. 
Indeed, Schröder, Hilbert, and others regarded it as a most noteworthy logicistic proposal. It 
could even be said, comparing Dedekind’s version of logicism with Russell’s in the Principles 
                                                       
14 The only shortcoming is that Dedekind did not differentiate clearly between injectivity and 
bijectivity: he defined the first concept but in fact he frequently employed the second. In all likelihood, 
Dedekind found it trivial and innocuous to restrict the codomain (final set) to the image. 
15 See Ferreirós (1993). 
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of 1903, that the former was a more explicit logicistic proposal to the extent that the latter 
adhered to so-called “if-thenism.”16 
 To summarize some key elements of Dedekind’s contribution to set theory, we should 
emphasize the following: the terminology of Dinge and Systeme, taken up by Hilbert (in 1897, 
1899 and 1900), and the statement that sets are “Dinge,” objects; the axiom of extensionality; 
the conceptual analysis behind Zermelo’s axiom of infinity; reliance on the unstated (and 
contradictory) principle of comprehension; the algebra of union and intersection. And his 
contribution to mapping theory: isolating the general notion itself (in the wake of previous work 
by Dirichlet and Riemann), dealing with injective and bijective mappings; the powerful theory 
of chains, the theorem of Cantor-Bernstein; and not least, in his algebraic studies, work with 
homomorphisms, isomorphisms, and automorphisms. The original theoretical developments for 
which he should be remembered include also the introduction of set-theoretic structures and the 
development of some crucial methods for their study (substructures, lattices, morphisms). His 
logicist ideas regarding mathematics led him to a view of mathematical existence that 
essentially prefigures that of Hilbert. And also regarding the deductive, axiomatic structuration 
of mathematical theories he is a key initiator. 
 Dedekind indeed had very positive ideas and conceptions to propose. In the end however, 
judging retrospectively, his contributions belong more to modern mathematics and algebra than 
to mathematical logic narrowly construed. But one should keep in mind that the golden age of 
logicism was characterized by the fact that those new ideas and methods seemed to link 
mathematics and logic indissolubly. Only insofar as the antinomies established that set theory 
goes well beyond logic, did this understanding change. This is just one of the ways in which 
placing Dedekind’s work more centrally is helpful to understand the history of logicism.  
 
II:  A Role for Transcendental Logic? 
Some aspects of Dedekind’s language have led readers to think that his approach was 
mentalistic or even psychologistic to the point that one cannot identify his position as close in 
any way to Frege’s logical thought. In his rhetoric we hear about “our thinking”, about “acts of 
the understanding”, and even about “my thought-world”. Far from Frege’s objectualism, he 
consistently presented the numbers as “free creations” of the human mind, from his earliest 
related piece in 1854 to his very last publication in 1913. What should we make of all this? 
Should we interpret his “logic” as mentalistic or not? 
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 Dedekind went to University in the 1850s and attended among others lectures in philosophy 
by Hermann R. Lotze. At that time idealism was no doubt on the retreat in Germany, scientism, 
mechanism and materialism were on the rise, but the influence of Romantic thought and 
writings still endured. In my view Dedekind adopted then, early in life, some favorite ideas and 
forms of expression that he would keep throughout his life, e.g. the idea that numbers are 
“creations of the mind.” But he would deprive such ideas more and more of any kind of 
idealistic or subjectivistic connotation. His logical ideas were objectivistic, even though some of 
his rhetoric preserved forms of expression that seem to contradict such a reading. 
 It seems very likely that Dedekind, like his friend Riemann, read at early age writings of 
Kant and of Leibniz;17 and I find it hard to interpret some of his more characteristic views 
without bringing in at least a few elements of Kantian thought. Dedekind characterized logic as 
the doctrine of the “Denkgesetze,” the laws of thought, which was just the mainstream view in 
the 19th century. In the Kantian view, such laws govern how we should think, not the 
psychology of how we actually think; pure logic is independent of psychology. This distinction 
did not originate with Frege, but was characteristic of the Kantian treatment of logic, which put 
forward an objectivistic conception of logic – even when Kant and followers spoke about the 
Self and its sphere of thinking.18 
 We shall consider below Dedekind’s infamous proposition 66 in Zahlen (1888, 357). Thus it 
begins: 
66. S a t z. Es gibt unendliche Systeme. 
Beweis. Meine Gedankenwelt, d. h. die Gesamtheit S aller Dinge, welche Gegenstand meines 
Denkens sein können, ist unendlich. … 
66. Theorem. There are infinite sets. 
Proof. My thought-world, i.e. the totality S of all things which can be an object of my thought, is 
infinite. … 
Not only is there talk of “my” thought and of an apparently psychological realm of thoughts, but 
in the proof a special role is played by a particular object: mein eigenes Ich, “my own Self.” 
Could things be worse? Well, indeed they are not so bad. Let me remind you that Kant, in the 
Critique of pure reason, Transcendental Deduction, says things as the following: 
The “I think” must be capable of accompanying all my representations, for otherwise something 
would be represented in me which could not be thought; … All the diversity or manifold content 
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author.  
18 Indeed the Kantian tradition, which included authors such as Herbart and Drobisch, was at the time 
identified as a strictly “formal” conception of logic and contrasted with the views of the idealists (see 
Ueberweg 1882, 47-53; also Ferreirós 1996, sect. II). 
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of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the “I think,” in the subject in which this 
diversity is found. But this representation, “I think,” is an act of spontaneity; that is to say, it 
cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it pure apperception … because it is 
self-consciousness which, whilst it gives birth to the representation “I think,” must necessarily be 
capable of accompanying all our representations… (Kant, Kritik B 132) 
Elsewhere he adds that the apperception “is the simple representation of the Self” (ist die 
einfache Vorstellung des Ich, B 68). This, I submit, is the Self to which Dedekind referred. 
 Now, of course Kant’s Ich is not psychological, but “transcendental” as he liked to say. 
Already in formal logic, as we have noticed, Kant and followers emphasized the need to avoid 
psychologism. And the idea of transcendental logic is not to analyse some psychological 
mechanism, but rather a scheme that applies to any possible thinking subject. Kant’s Ich is not a 
particular subject, but a necessary component of any process of thought and representation, 
intuitive or not.19 In Dedekind’s expression “meine Gedankenwelt,” my thought-world, we must 
understand that “me” is the transcendental Self: one might just as well read the thought-world.  
 I should add that my reconstruction finds support in Hilbert’s views on the matter expressed 
in 1905. Before saying that he cannot accept Dedekind’s approach to the foundations of 
arithmetic because the notion of a totality of all things involves an unavoidable contradiction, 
Hilbert remarks that he “would characterize his method as transcendental insofar as he proves 
the existence of the infinite following a path whose fundamental idea is used in a similar way by 
philosophers” (Hilbert 1905, 175). 
 More generally, I believe that all of Dedekind’s declarations regarding logic, thinking, acts 
of the understanding, the thought-world, numbers, and mathematics, must be interpreted in an 
objectivistic sense. Once we do this, the distance between his position and Frege’s does not 
seem so unbridgeable. And this seems to be the way Dedekind himself saw it. In the second 
Preface to Zahlen, 1893, he emphasized the “points of very close contact” with Frege, the fact 
that they “stand upon the same ground” in crucial points of the analysis of number (as in 
particular mathematical induction; 1888, 342). 
 In the proof of theorem 66, Dedekind defines a mapping ϕ: S → S such that the image of a 
certain thought t is the thought “t can be an object of my thought”. I call the reader’s attention to 
the characteristic modal element, which Dedekind emphasizes: we are dealing with something 
that can be an object of thought, not with actual but with possible thoughts. This is interestingly 
close to Kant’s statements like the one quoted above, and the idea that logic delineates the realm 
of the possible was not uncommon (from Leibniz to Wittgenstein). Plus, of course Dedekind 
                                                       
19 The idea is very Cartesian, of course, but perhaps it can also be linked with the well-known truth of 
first-order logic with identity: ∃x (x = x). 
 10 
accepted that our actual thoughts, the realm of what is present to the psychological ego at any 
given time, do not form an actual infinity. This alone might suffice to establish that his position 
is not psychologistic: at stake is what belongs to the Gedankenwelt by right, not in any actual 
psychological experience. 
 Readers who may still not be convinced might probably object that Dedekind’s view of 
numbers as “free creations of the mind” sets him in the antipodes of logicism. But, firstly, one 
must interpret creations of the transcendental or the logical mind – creations without the least 
mark of subjectivism. Second, I would like to call your attention to the fact that Dedekind’s 
appeals to creation (Schöpfung) became more and more rigid, more and more strictly regulated 
by the general laws of logic. In 1854, he had in mind the way in which “we” successively create 
or generate the series 1, 2, 3, …, and also the ulterior “creation” of new kinds of number in 
response to a requirement of closure under the inverse operations. Already at that early point (he 
was 23 years old) Dedekind emphasized the lack of arbitrariness of these successive acts of 
“introduction” of new numbers, operations and functions in mathematics.20 Later, in 1872, he 
proposed the creation of new individuals, the irrational numbers, as images of the irrational cuts 
on the set of rational numbers. But he stressed that no property of the new individuals could be 
ascribed arbitrarily; rather, everything depends strictly on the behaviour of the cuts, regulated by 
the laws of the logic of sets. To hammer this point, let me quote a letter where he emphasizes 
that nothing essential depends on the creation of new numbers: 
if one does not want to introduce any new numbers, I have nothing against it; the theorem I have 
proved ([1872,] § 5, IV) reads then as follows: the set of all cuts in the domain of the rational 
numbers, which itself is discontinuous, forms a continuous manifold (letter to Lipschitz, June 
1876; Dedekind 1932, vol. 3, 471). 
Some years later, in 1888, the “creation” that we are talking about becomes truly Pickwickian: 
suppose given a simply infinite set N, ordered by a mapping φ; “if in the consideration of” such 
a set 
we entirely neglect the special character of the elements, merely retaining their distinguishability 
and taking into account only the relations to one another in which they are placed by the ordering 
mapping φ, then are these elements called natural numbers or ordinal numbers or simply numbers, 
and the base-element 1 is called the base-number of the number-series N. In consideration of this 
freeing the elements from any other content (abstraction) we are justified in calling numbers a free 
creation of the human mind (eine freie Schöpfung des menschlichen Geistes; 1888, 360). 
Now it is not even a matter of creating new individuals, but merely of regarding given 
individuals merely from the point of view of an axiomatically characterized structure to which 
                                                       
20 See Dedekind (1854), especially p. 430: “diese Erweiterungen der Definitionen lassen der Willkür 
keinen Raum mehr, sondern sie folgen mit zwingender Notwendigkeit…”.  
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they belong, abstracting from any other of their properties. Taking into account the purely 
logical character ascribed by Dedekind to the “general laws” reigning over sets and mappings, 
and the fact that the “creation” of numbers is strictly regulated by such laws, it seems to me that 
his talk of numbers as “free creations of the mind” does not cause any tension with a crisp form 
of logicism. 
 It is interesting to consider how these matters are linked with Dedekind’s views on existence 
proofs and consistency (in the modern sense, Widerspruchsfreiheit, absence of contradiction). In 
another letter to Lipschitz, July 1876, Dedekind goes on to emphasize that 
nothing is more dangerous in mathematics, than to presuppose existences without sufficient 
proof… How shall the admissible assumptions of existence be distinguished from the innumerably 
many inadmissible ones …? Shall this be made to depend only on success, on the casual awareness 
of an internal contradiction?”21  
This general theme was clearly very present in his mind between 1876 and 1888, and it led to 
the proofs for the existence of infinite sets and simply infinite sets. In the 1870s draft for Zahlen 
one finds the problem expressed, e.g. in its part II (out of V), when Dedekind formulates and 
proves the 
Theorem of complete induction. A concept (proposition), into which an arbitrary number n enters, 
is completely defined (proven) when it is defined (proven) for n = 1, and when a rule is given 
according to which, from the definition [sic] of the correctness of the proposition for an arbitrary n 
the definition (the truth) for n’ can always be derived. 
Dedekind gives a still rudimentary proof, but subsequently he inserts a side remark: 
The proof of the correctness of the proof-method from n to n+1 is right; by contrast the proof 
(completeness) of the concept-definition by the method from n to n+1 is at this point not yet 
sufficient; the existence (free from contradiction) of the concept remains dubious. This will first be 
possible through the distinctness, through consideration of the set [n]!!!!!! Foundation.22 
(At this point, [n] denotes an initial segment of N; “distinct” is the technical term for an injective 
mapping, but also for bijectively related, i.e. equipollent sets.) Once more it is unfortunate that 
Dedekind devoted almost no space in Zahlen to an explanation of the methodological criteria he 
                                                       
21 Ded 1932, vol. 3, 477. Here is the full text: “da die stetige Vollständigkeit der reellen Zahlen für den 
wissenschaftlichen Aufbau der Arithmetik unentbehrlich ist, so ist unerläßlich von vorneherein genau zu 
wissen, wie vollständig das Gebiet der Grössen ist, weil Nichts in der Mathematik gefährlicher ist, als 
ohne genügenden Beweis Existenzen anzunehmen und zwar erst dann, wenn die Noth, das augenbickliche 
Bedürfniß es gebeut. Woran sollen die erlaubten Existenz-Annahmen erkannt und von den unzähligen 
unerlaubten unterschieden werden… ? Soll dies nur von dem Erfolge, von dem zufälligen Gewahrwerden 
eines inneren Widerspruchs abhängig gemacht werden?” 
22 This draft has been published in Dugac (1976), Appendix LVI; see p. 300. “Der Beweis der 
Richtigkeit der Beweismethode von n auf n+1 ist richtig; dagegen ist der Beweis (Vollständigkeit) der 
Begriffserklärung durch die Methode von n auf n+1 auf dieser Stelle noch nicht genügend; die Existenz 
(widerspruchsfrei) des Begriffs bleibt zweifelhaft. Dies wird erst möglich durch die Deutlichkeit, durch 
die Betrachtung des Systems [n]!!!!!! Fundament.” 
 
 12 
was setting for himself. But the question found expression shortly thereafter in the famous letter 
to Keferstein, Febr. 1890. Talking about theorems 66 and 72, Dedekind remarks: 
After the essential nature of the simply infinite system, whose abstract type is the number 
sequence N, had been recognized in my analysis (articles 71 and 73), the question arose: does such 
a system exist at all in our realm of thought? Without a logical proof of existence it would always 
remain doubtful whether the notion of such a system might not perhaps contain internal 
contradictions. Hence the need for such proofs (articles 66 and 72 of my essay). (van Heijenoort 
1967, 101) 
As I have defended elsewhere, Hilbert was embracing exactly the same viewpoint in his famous 
statements regarding consistency proofs expressed in the year 1900 – only later, from 1903, 
would he make the shift towards the notion of a syntactic proof of consistency (Ferreirós 2009). 
 Let me come back to Theorems 66 and 72 in Zahlen (1888, 357 & 359). Some readers find 
them rather mysterious, to the point of even finding difficulty to distinguish their contents, since 
superficially they seem to repeat the same argument. But this is not at all the case: Th. 66 is a 
proof that the thought-world V is Dedekind-infinite, hence there exist infinite sets; Th. 72 
proves that there exists a simply infinite set. In order to prove 66, one must identify an injective 
mapping ϕ: V → V and one object not in the image ϕ(V); we have seen that the mapping assigns 
to a certain thought t the image ϕ(t): “t can be an object of my thought”. This does not depend 
on any empirical aspect of concrete thought. As for the object that does not belong to ϕ(V), 
Dedekind chooses “e.g.” the Ich, “my own Self”; once again, what he chooses does not depend 
on any empirical, given characteristic of reality, but is (according to Kantian doctrine) a 
necessary accompaniment of any possible representation or thought. It seems to me that, all in 
all, Dedekind is trying hard to stick to the principle that logic does not depend on what there is, 
concretely given in actual reality, but has to do only with general laws that apply to any possible 
reality. 
 Theorem 72 assumes given any Dedekind-infinite set I (in particular one may consider V, in 
view of Th. 66, but also any other example). Since I is infinite, according to Dedekind’s 
definition of infinity, it must come with (at least) one distinguished element e and an injective 
mapping ψ, such that e ∉ ψ(I). From this assumption it is proven that there is a subset of I – the 
chain ψ0(e) or minimal closure of the unitary set {e}
23 under ψ – which is a simply infinite set. It 
could hardly be more different than Th. 66. (Of course, if we apply the argument starting from 
                                                       
23 It is well known that Dedekind’s sign-language exploited a confusion of the thing e and the 
corresponding unitary set. Bad symbolism, but there was no conceptual misunderstanding; this is shown 
by several manuscripts, including one of 1889 where he denotes the unitary set by “[e]” (see also 
‘Gefahren der Systemlehre’, where he shows that the ambiguity can be used to derive a contradiction). 
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V, the distinguished element “my own Self” and the mapping ϕ: V → V will be as above; but the 
difference remains exactly the same.) 
 
III:  Formal Logic, the Principle of Comprehension. 
I have acknowledged as the most relevant objection that Dedekind did not develop a full system 
of formal logic. In effect, he did not elaborate a theory of deduction, and even less did he aim to 
reduce deduction to a calculus. One will look in vain for explicit treatment of the elementary 
rules of inference he was employing, of the propositional connectives or the quantifiers in his 
work (the latter is no doubt the most significant lacuna, and after all the quantifiers could have 
been regarded as set-operators). He did not have a system comparable to that of Peano, not to 
mention the much more rigorous one of Frege; even worse, Dedekind was not very interested in 
formal languages, and one should say that his “logic” was abstract and not formal.  
 This is linked with some mysterious ingredients of his viewpoint. The mysterious bit comes 
into play when one tries to go deeper into the question, how Dedekind’s views and his methods 
relate to formal logic and the emergence of the new logical calculi. To make a long story short, 
his understanding of logic belongs to a tradition that falls outside van Heijenoort’s famous 
distinction between logic-as-language and logic-as-calculus, a distinction thus shown not to be 
all inclusive.24 Let me call the third way logic-as-thought, and say summarily that the early 
Hilbert of the 1900s, the Hungarian G. König in 1914, and Zermelo even as late as 1930, all 
belong to it. This tradition has remained inspirational to many mathematical logicians, I believe, 
even though it causes tension with the strictly formal orientation that is most characteristic of 
20th century mathematical logic. 
 Let me now explain. Although Dedekind had some interest in the new logical calculi, to the 
point that in the late 1890s his style was influenced by Schröder’s (e.g., he worked more 
explicitly formally with the axioms he set up for lattice theory), the overall orientation of his 
work was to move mathematics away from symbolic forms, and in particular to move algebra 
away from its traditional concentration of equations, polynomials and other “forms of 
representation”. He has always been regarded as an exponent of the “conceptual turn” of 
German mathematics, insisting throughout his life on Riemann as a model and on the avoidance 
of symbolic forms of representation as a key guiding principle (see below).  
 This was not mere blurb, since that principle can be seen at work behind the most 
characteristic new methods that Dedekind developed. Interestingly, the issue has ramifications 
in what concerns the link between set theory and formal logic. In previous work I have called 
                                                       
24 See van Heijenoort (1967a). 
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attention to the intriguing fact that the principle of comprehension is clearer in Dedekind’s work 
of the 1870s than in Zahlen (1888). This makes little sense at first sight. Zahlen is a more 
explicit presentation of the basic notions and principles of Dedekind’s foundational work, and 
one should expect to find the principle of comprehension here. 
 For those who may doubt that Dedekind was in favor of Comprehension, let me offer a few 
quotations. Particularly relevant is the “First draft 1872-1878” of Zahlen, edited by P. Dugac. In 
a text that must be dated 1872 or at most a couple years later, we find the clear statement: 
To possess a property E means to belong to a set S, namely the set S of all things that possess the 
property E.25 (Dugac 1976, Appendix LVI, 296) 
Also a bit earlier we find the following: 
A set or collection [or manifold] S of things is determined when for every thing it can be judged 
whether it belongs to the set or not. … All those things possessing a common property are usually 
treated, insofar as distinguishing between them is not important, as a new thing by contrast to the 
other things. This is called a set or collection of all those things.26 (Dugac 1976, 293, emphasis 
added) 
As one can see, there is a quite clear formulation and endorsement of Comprehension in the first 
draft of Dedekind’s booklet. 
 Other mathematicians were also aware of the fact that Dedekind favored the principle of 
comprehension, and with it a logicistic conception of the foundations of set theory, hence 
“naïve” set theory. Here is what Cantor wrote to Hilbert in Nov. 1899: 
… the key point of his [Dedekind’s] researches must be seen in the naïve assumption that all well-
defined collections, or systems, are likewise «consistent systems». You have convinced yourself 
that the aforementioned assumption is erroneous [this remark refers to Hilbert (1900)]… (Purkert 
& Ilgauds 1987, 154) 
Cantor is referring to the antinomies of the ordinals and of the alephs (usually named Burali-
Forti’s and Cantor’s paradox) and to his proposed distinction between «consistent systems» or 
sets and «inconsistent systems», i.e., multiplicities that do not form a unity. He also emphasizes 
that Dedekind’s approach is “in diametrical opposition” to Cantor’s understanding of the 
foundations of set theory. Now, the principle that “all well-defined collections” are sets is but 
the principle of comprehension: for a set to be given, it is sufficient to determine it through a 
well-defined concept.27 
                                                       
25 In all cases I translate the German “System” by “set”, just like Dedekind translated it into “ensemble” 
in French. No significant misrepresentation is caused by this. 
26 I should remind the reader that “thing” is a technical term of Dedekind’s logic. A “thing” is a 
thought-object, “any object of our thinking” (Dugac 1976, 293; Dedekind 1888, 344) such as 1, my own 
self, or – say – Leibniz. 
27 Hilbert himself shared this conviction of Dedekind’s up to 1897: “The collection of all alephs can be 
conceived as a well-defined and concrete set, for given any thing one can always determine whether it is 
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 Coming back to Zahlen, Comprehension is still clearly visible in remark 60, which 
comments upon the (generalized) Theorem of complete induction, which Dedekind has just 
proven (1888, 355). But if one compares the published text with the first draft, it is interesting to 
see that the Theorem of complete induction receives a more abstract and purely set-theoretic 
formulation, while back in 1872 it was formulated dually for “a concept f(n)” and for a 
“proposition in which an indeterminate thing n of the set (1) appears”.28 But the main question 
is, why did Dedekind avoid to make the principle more explicit? Why did he not formulate it as 
clearly as around 1875?  
 The proper place would have been point 2. of the booklet, where he preferred the vague 
formulation: “It is very often the case that different things a, b, c … are conceived under a 
common viewpoint for any reason, and set together in the mind; one then says that they form a 
set…” (Dedekind 1888, 344). (By contrast, the principle of extensionality was emphasized; see 
1888, 345.) 
 After a long puzzlement over this little mystery, I have come to the following conclusion. I 
believe that it was fully intentionally that Dedekind avoided setting the principle of 
comprehension as the basis for set theory. The reason was not that he somehow anticipated that 
Comprehension was contradictory – he did not foresee that. The reason had to do (1) with deep-
seated convictions regarding the methodology of pure mathematics, and (2) with a possible 
shortcoming of that approach. 
 (1) From very early on, Dedekind became an admirer of Riemann’s work and a partisan of 
the so-called “conceptual turn”. He emphasized that mathematical concepts and theories ought 
not to be based on “particular forms of representation”, but on “invariant characteristic 
properties” of a more abstract kind. Quoting Gauss, who had written that “such truths should be 
extracted from concepts rather than notations,” he called this a “decision for the inner in contrast 
to the outer”.29 As an example, Dedekind regarded his definition of an ideal (as a set of integers 
closed under sum and difference, and under product by any integer in the ring) as based on a 
“characteristic inner property”, in contrast to the definition, employed by Hurwitz, as the set of 
all numbers representable by 
η0α0 + η1α1  + … + ηrαr 
                                                                                                                                                                
an aleph or not; and nothing else can be required from a well-defined set.” (quoted verbatim by Cantor in 
his letter of Oct. 2, 1897, from Hilbert’s previous letter. See Purkert & Ilgauds 1987, 226). 
28 See Dugac 1976, 295. The set (1) is just N, the ϕ0(1) of (1888), i.e. the ϕ-chain of the unitary set {1}. 
To quote fully this noteworthy text: “If a concept f(n) in which an indeterminate thing n of the set (1) 
appears (a function of n) is defined for n = 1, and if a general rule is given to derive from the 
determination of the concept for thing n the determination of the concept for its image n’, then the 
concept is completely defined.” A “parallel theorem” replaces proposition for concept, proven for defined. 
29 For details see Ferreirós (1999), 100-103, and 28-31. 
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with α0, α1, …, αr given integers, and η0, η1, …, ηr arbitrary integers in the ring. He regarded 
Hurwitz’s definition as objectionable since it was based on an “outer form of representation” 
which could be replaced by infinitely many others (changing the basis α0, α1, …, αr), hence did 
not make explicit the “invariance” of the defined concept (Dedekind 1895, 55). 
 The tendency was thus to decrease formalization in mathematics, while the development of 
formal calculi could be seen as increasing it.30 Judged from this standpoint, reliance on 
Comprehension as the basis of set theory could make the realm of sets depend on “arbitrary” 
particular traits of the language under consideration. Sets would be defined through particular 
representations, thus disguising their essential invariance, and the same set might be definable in 
two different ways (e.g. the famous case of the unfeathered biped). Worse, it was even 
conceivable that this way of approaching the matter might compromise the richness of the realm 
of sets. This is related with the potential shortcoming: 
 (2) There is evidence that Dedekind was distrustful of linguistic representations for the 
reason that no language could be rich enough to allow explicit expressions for all mathematical 
objects. He arrived at this conclusion by reflecting on the definition or “creation” of the real 
numbers, and obviously he was convinced that no symbolic language (Zeichensprache) was rich 
enough to designate each one of them. I cannot judge when he came to this reflection, but it 
could well have been between 1875 and 1887, and related to his distancing from the principle of 
comprehension. In a letter to his good friend H. Weber, Jan. 1888, he is emphasizing the 
pedagogic convenience of introducing new individuals corresponding to the irrational cuts, and 
“the right we have to arrogate to ourselves such a creative faculty (Schöpfungskraft)”; and he 
writes: 
Whether the symbolic language suffices to designate each one of the new individuals [the 
irrationals] that are to be created, does not carry any weight; it always suffices to designate the 
individuals that turn up in any (limited) investigation.31 
As one can see, he defends the possibility of “creating” non-denumerably many new 
individuals, on the basis of fully general logical laws, on the face of the impossibility for our 
                                                       
30 As Tappenden (2006) has emphasized, Frege too was influenced by Riemann and his “conceptual” 
style. There might seem to exist a tension between his and Dedekind’s Riemannian background, but I do 
not see this as a necessary conclusion: the “particular forms of representation” that Riemann and 
Dedekind wished to avoid were arithmetico-analytic formulas (like power series), so their objections to 
such formulas do not affect the symbolic representation of thoughts in Frege’s conceptography. It is 
interesting and certainly relevant to compare the letters exchanged between Frege and Hilbert in 1895 
(Frege 1980, 32; notice how close Hilbert’s first remark was to Dedekind’s views). However, we cannot 
pursue this matter any further, at least here. 
31 Dedekind 1932, vol. 3, 490: “Ob ferner die Zeichensprache ausreicht, um alle neu zu schaffenden 
Individuen einzeln zu bezeichnen, fällt nicht ins Gewicht; sie reicht immer dazu aus, um die in irgend 
einer (begrenzten) Untersuchung autretenden Individuen zu bezeichnen.” 
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sign-languages to determine them explicitly.32 This may have become a strong reason to avoid 
defining the realm of sets as the counterpart of any given system of linguistic expressions. 
 The idea would then be that the principle “To possess a property E means to belong to a set 
S, namely the set S of all things that possess the property E” (see above) is only valid in one 
direction. Possessing a property means belonging to a set, but belonging to a set does not mean 
possessing a property that can be represented in a given symbolic language. You might try to 
object and refer to the property “x ∈ S”, but remember that the sets cannot be designated one by 
one, our sign-languages only suffice to designate the sets that turn up in limited investigations. 
 It seems to me quite likely that this lack of coherence (1) between the principle of 
comprehension and the methodological principle of avoiding forms of representation, plus (2) 
the potential shortcoming of the formal approach, were resolved by Dedekind in his decision to 
relegate Comprehension in Zahlen. 
 Before moving on, let me just indicate that all of this does not, in the least, mean that 
Dedekind was far from modern axiomatic thinking. There is a common misunderstanding that 
axiomatic thinking in mathematics is and must be formal, symbolic. But the mainstream 
tradition of axiomatic work in the 20th century has not been strictly formalistic – it is a 
somewhat “informal” style of work, based on a relatively naïve understanding of set theory. 
This mainstream style of work can be found in Dedekind’s algebraic and number theoretic 
work, and also in Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie – contrasting with his formalistic style of 
work in the 1920s.33 
 
IV: A Reconstruction of Dedekind’s Dichotomy Conception. 
Even distancing oneself from Frege’s excessive zeal (section I), it is obvious that Dedekind’s 
work could be improved. His concepts of set and map were precise for all practical purposes, 
but the basic principles on which the system rested should have been laid out more clearly. Let 
me briefly indicate a possible reconstruction of Dedekind’s mature viewpoint in set theory. This 
would be a version of the dichotomy conception, which holds that a set is determined top-down, 
by partitioning the class of everything into two parts,34 but expressed in an abstract form. 
Although my reconstruction is more explicit than what we find in Zahlen, I have strived to make 
this proposal entirely consistent with the spirit of Dedekind’s methods in the 1880s and 1890s. 
                                                       
32 A set is fully determined when for every thing it is determinate whether it belongs to S or not, but the 
general laws of set theory (logic) do not depend at all on how this determination is brought about, or even 
on whether we are in a position to decide (ob wir einen Weg kennen, um hierüber zu entscheiden). It is 
not justified (berechtigt) to limit the “free conceptual formation in mathematics” (freien Begriffsbildung 
in der Mathematik) in the manner of Kronecker (Dedekind 1888, 345). 
33 See among other works Corry (1996), Sieg & Schlimm (2005), Ferreirós (1999) and (2009). 
34 See Gödel 1947, 180. 
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 His theory of sets would be based on two “basic laws”, which he regarded as key ingredients 
of an abstract logic dealing with the theory of sets: 
 
 (A) Subsets: Any subcollection of a set S is itself a set, a “thing” S’ ⊆ S.  
(One must consider here not only subcollections definable by expressions in a symbolic 
language or Zeichensprache, but any arbitrary collection of elements of S.35) 
 
 (B) Universal Set: The totality of all things is another thing, a set V, the “thought-world” 
(Gedankenwelt) or Universal set. 
 
Let me remind you that “thing” is a technical term which applies to any object of thought, and 
the criterion of identity for things is the Leibnizian one (Dedekind 1888, 344). 
 The principle of comprehension can now be proven as a theorem, an easy consequence of 
(A) and (B):  
 
 Theorem of Comprehension. Given any property E(x) there exists the set S = {x: E(x)}. 
 
 Proof. All those things that satisfy E(x) are elements of V, which is a set by (B). Therefore, 
by (A), the subcollection of V which consists in {x: E(x)} is itself a thing, a set S. Q.E.D. 
 
It is well known that, conversely, Comprehension suffices to prove principle (B), but one can 
argue – as established in the discussion above – that, as soon as we require a formal version of 
Comprehension based on an explicit symbolic language, it is not enough to prove (A). This 
principle (A) is strictly stronger, and it entails Choice. 
 The interesting trait of this reconstruction is the abstract nature of the presupposed logic. As 
I indicated above, Dedekind does not belong to Frege’s tradition of logic-as-language, nor to 
Schröder’s of logic-as-calculus, but rather to a third tradition of logic-as-thought, abstract 
thought.  
 One might think that two indispensable basic principles escaped Dedekind’s attention: the 
principle of Powerset, which was needed in order to develop the theory of real numbers from 
the natural numbers; and the principle of Choice, implicitly used in some of his previous work 
                                                       
35 This principle of subsets is thus meant to include but transcend the Separation principle of first-order 
ZFC. 
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and also towards the end of his booklet.36 Let me add that I used to think this way, too. However, 
under the reconstruction presented above this is not correct.  
 Choice would be a somewhat obvious application of principles in the theory of maps or sets: 
given a family of sets F, one has a mapping which assigns to every x ∈ F an element ex ∈ x 
(indeed there are infinitely many mappings, as soon as one of the x ∈ F is infinite); 
alternatively, given the family F one has the union set ∪F = {x: ∃y (x ∈ y ∧ y ∈ F)}, which 
exists by the Theorem of Comprehension, and by principle (A) of Subsets there is a choice set G 
⊂ ∪F which fulfils the desired condition.  
 As for the Powerset principle, one should note that every subcollection of S is a set by 
principle (A), and that the powerset ℘(S) is simply {x: x ⊆ S}, which exists by the Theorem of 
Comprehension. (Dedekind did not formulate Powerset explicitly, and it will only appear in 
print with Russell (1903), but his reliance on the set of all cuts of Q for the definition of the real 
numbers was a crucial step in that direction.37) 
 A somewhat related matter perhaps deserves to be mentioned here. In other work I have tried 
to make clear that Dedekind’s methods led him to develop a “set-theoretic” style of axiomatic 
analysis that is quite different from the work of Peano on the natural numbers, or that of Hilbert 
on geometry and the real numbers. I have come to the conclusion that Peano himself saw such 
differences between his axiomatisation of 1889 and Dedekind’s of 1888 (see Ferreirós 2005). 
To clarify the matter, let me remind you of Dedekind’s axioms: A simply infinite set N has a 
distinguished element e and an ordering mapping ϕ such that 
1. ϕ(N) ⊆ N      2. e ∉ ϕ(N) 
3. N = ϕ0(e), i.e. N is the ϕ-chain of the unitary set {e} 
4. ϕ is an injective mapping from N to N, i.e. if ϕ(a) = ϕ(b) then a = b. 
Leaving aside axioms 2. and 4., which are more easy to assimilate to Peano’s axioms, the other 
two axioms are characteristically set-theoretic in the intended sense, and not elementary as most 
of Peano’s and Hilbert’s axioms.  
 Peano tended to impose conditions on the behaviour of his individuals, the natural numbers, 
and the operations on them. These are elementary conditions which most often are amenable to 
formalization within first-order logic. Dedekind establishes structural conditions on subsets of 
the (structured) sets he is defining, on the behaviour of relevant maps, or both things at a time. 
Axiom 1. says that N is closed under the map ϕ, axiom 3. says that N is the minimal closure of 
                                                       
36 According to Heck (1998), this principle did not escape Frege’s attention, who noticed it in the 
course of analyzing Dedekind’s proofs; and it was also noticed by Peano and his associates (Bettazzi, B. 
Levi). See Moore (1982), chap. 1. 
37 Cantor considered and rejected it in letters to Hilbert of Oct. 1898; see Ferreirós 1999, 447-448. 
 20 
the unitary set {e} under ϕ. Such axioms are non-elementary and tend to require second-order 
logic for their formalisation, as happens with axiom 3 (however, 1. is easy to formalize in first 
order). This feature of his methodology becomes clearer still in Dedekind’s algebraic work, for 
instance his use of module theory for establishing the theory of ideals, and his map-theoretic 
approach to Galois theory. 
 
IV: Dedekind vs. Frege: Philosophical Differences. 
There is of course no denying the differences between Dedekind and Frege: we find some 
strong similarities between their versions of logicism, but there are also key disparities. I do not 
wish to deny that the style or methodology of their ways of treating the foundations of 
arithmetic is quite different; however, it is my conviction that philosophical differences in their 
understanding of logic and mathematics were more important than any difference having to do 
with formal logic. (One can say that Frege tends to work more formally and, as far as possible, 
closer to an elementary logical treatment, while Dedekind works in an explicitly set-theoretic 
style. This is shown e.g. by the contrast between Dedekind’s heavy use of chain theory in his 
development of the laws of arithmetic,38 and Frege’s development which relies mainly on the 
second-order system that has the Cantor-Hume principle as its sole axiom (Fregean arithmetic). 
The contrast is reflected in a difference that Frege himself emphasized, namely that Dedekind 
first defines the infinite and then takes the finite to be non-infinite, while Frege first defined the 
finite, after which the infinite appears as the non-finite.39 It would be desirable that someone 
undertakes a full study of these methodological differences.) 
 Thus, I believe it was mainly philosophical differences – coupled with some incorrect and 
uncharitative interpretations that we have already discussed – that led Frege to insist on the idea 
that Dedekind’s work “hardly contributes to its confirmation [of his logicistic viewpoint]” 
(1893, 3). We can summarize the key disparities between them as follows: 
(i) the lack of a formal symbolic logic and above all formal derivations in Dedekind;  
(ii) the intensional approach favored by Frege and Russell, contrasting with Dedekind’s 
preference for the extensional; and  
(iii) the structuralist approach to mathematical objects adopted by Dedekind, which 
contrasts with Frege’s and Russell’s “objectualism” or “singularism”.40  
                                                       
38 Given σ: S → S, and a subset A ⊆ S, the chain of A is the closure of A under σ in S, which Dedekind 
defines as an intersection of sets closed under σ (denoted σ0(A) or A0). In the case of interest, where σ is 
the successor function, chains are infinite structures and so Dedekind’s approach is heavily “infinitistic.” 
39 See Frege’s review of Cantor’s Zur Lehre vom Transfiniten, in (Frege 1984, 180) and also Heck 
(1998), which compares Dedekind’s with Frege’s treatment. 
40 It is interesting that, while Dedekind is “less modern” as to (i), he was much closer to modern 
mathematics as to (ii) and (iii). 
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Dedekind’s position was specific and peculiar compared to Frege, Russell, Peano, etcetera, and 
perhaps it was closer to Schröder’s. But there is no reason to tie logicism so strongly with 
Frege’s philosophical views that any approach deviating from his in a single trait immediately 
fails to be logicistic. 
 That however happens somewhat often. Benis-Sinaceur (2008) argues that another reason 
why Dedekind’s views do not qualify as logicism is because he did not have a theory of a priori 
objects. This last is true, actually Dedekind’s views tended to be incompatible with the idea that 
logic or mathematics has to do with a priori objects, if by that we mean objects that are fully 
and totally independent of thought. But the crux of logicism, the proposal of a reduction of 
mathematics to logic, is not necessarily linked with this philosophical understanding of logic. 
Logic is not necessarily a theory of a priori objects, but rather a theory of inference, of 
consequence relations. To use the typical 19th century phrase, logic is a theory of the (normative, 
not psychological) “laws of thought”, or, if you prefer to follow the mature Frege, a theory of 
the “laws of being true” – which by no means necessarily require the existence of an object 
Truth à la Frege. 
 The contrast between an intensional and an extensional approach is central to understanding 
Frege’s negative reaction to the notion of set. Instead of taking as a basis the extensional notion 
of set, he opted emphatically for the intensional notion of a concept.41 Frege (1893, pp. 2-3) 
complained that Dedekind lacked a precise concept of set, and even that this concept of 
“system” or “class” favored by some mathematicians of his time had nothing to do with logic. 
This was especially because it was an extensional concept, not an intensional one as Frege 
preferred,42 and because mathematicians failed to tie it with the logical notion of a concept. He 
even argued that the idea of set employed by his contemporaries is nothing but the idea of a 
concrete group of physical objects, e.g. a pile of stones; otherwise put, he insisted that a class or 
a set is not a concept-extension, that a class is and can only be a class-as-many (Russell 1903). 
As applied to Dedekind (1888) this is a totally unfair interpretation, which led Frege to 
incorrectly identify the reasons why Dedekind “preferred” to avoid the introduction of an empty 
set.43 
                                                       
41 A concept is defined by its attributes or properties, and two concepts may be different although they 
apply to the same objects. This is what “intensional” signifies. Every featherless biped is a human being, 
and vice versa, but nobody would claim that the two concepts are identical; their extensions are, by 
Frege’s Law V. 
42 Needless to say, the evaluation of this matter offered by a Quinean logician would be exactly the 
opposite of Frege’s. 
43 Manuscripts written both years before 1888, and also immediately after, make it clear that Dedekind 
accepted the empty set on the very same grounds as Frege (as the extension of a contradictory concept), 
and also that he understood perfectly well the distinction between a and {a}. 
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 But the great logician acknowledged explicitly that in his approach “concept” plays a role 
analogous to “set” in Dedekind’s (Frege 1893, 3). And his theory of numbers depended 
crucially upon concept-extensions (Begriffsumfänge),44 which in the more general form of 
values-ranges constituted the most important addition to his Begriffsschrift in the period from 
1879 to the Grundgesetze (1893). Taking this into account, and given that Frege accepted the 
principle of comprehension,45 the extreme differences alleged by him diminish very greatly, 
coming down (for the most part) to a question of philosophical interpretation of logic. 
 As we have seen, Dedekind’s development from 1872 to 1888 was actually away from 
basing set theory on Comprehension, and thus away from a focus on concepts or intensional 
notions. His approach to mappings was also decidedly extensional, and his mathematical 
methods were becoming more and more abstract and structural. One might argue that this marks 
a clear methodological difference with respect to logicists such as Frege and Russell, who were 
insisting on the intensional. Indeed, the contrast intensional/extensional seems to be behind the 
contrasts in style and methodology that we remarked above. 
 But once again, although differences become apparent, if we take into account the history of 
logic and logicism broadly construed, the argument that such differences turn Dedekind into 
something else than a logicist is far from convincing. Schröder too was clearly in favor of an 
extensional approach to logic, and in Dedekind’s time, under his influence, Schröder became a 
logicist. Something similar holds also for Hilbert (Ferreirós 2009). Or if we look at the 1920s, 
Frank Ramsey influentially tried to amend Russell’s logicism, and in order to do so he 
abandoned the intensional emphasis of his predecessors and opted for an extensional viewpoint. 
Carnap’s views in 1928 were also of this kind. 
 As significant as the intensional/extensional difference, and perhaps more important for 
present-day discussions, is the contrast between Frege’s singularism and Dedekind’s 
structuralism. Frege emphasized that numbers are and must be concrete, uniquely determined 
objects, each number being a single particular objective thing which is given a priori and which 
is “by its nature” suited to play the role it plays. Thus, the cardinal numbers (1, 2, 3, ℵ0) are 
                                                       
44 See Frege’s own statements in a letter to Russell (28 july 1902): “the question is, How do we 
apprehend logical objects? And I have found no other answer to it than this, as value-ranges of 
functions. I have always been aware that there were difficulties with this, and your discovery of the 
contradiction has added to them; but what other way is there?” (cited by Heck in Demopoulos 1995, p. 
286). See also Grundgesetze (1893), vii and ix—x. Incidentally, it has been suggested by Sundholm 
(2001) that Frege adopted value-ranges in 1889/90 as a reaction to Dedekind’s Zahlen, on which he 
lectured that year at Jena. On the need for value-ranges in order to analyze Dedekind’s work within 
Frege’s Begriffsschrift, see Heck (1998). 
45 Let me add that Frege’s famous Law V, which he himself regarded as dubious in (1893, vii) and later 
blamed for giving rise to antinomies, is not a statement of Comprehension, but rather of the principle of 
Extensionality for concept-extensions (Ferreirós 1999, 303-304). Comprehension is inbuilt into Frege’s 
symbolism, which allows unrestrictedly the transition from a concept Φ(ε) to its extension έΦ(ε). If one 
were to produce a zealous critique in Frege’s style, one could say that his supposedly infallible tools of 
analysis were insufficient to make him analyze properly the principles on which he was relying. 
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intrinsically apt to express cardinalities, and the real numbers (√5, π, e) are intrinsically 
“designed”, so to say, to measure magnitudes. One might perhaps talk of a form of essentialistic 
objectualism, but I prefer to call it Frege’s “singularism”.  
 In the case of Dedekind, we find nothing like that, but rather a form of structuralism. 
Anything could be (or better: play the role of) a natural or a real number, provided it belongs to a 
set which has the characteristic structure of the set of natural numbers – a “simply infinite” set – 
viz. the set of real numbers – a totally and densely ordered field with the Cut property. There is 
nothing singular or concrete about the objects, since any object whatsoever may belong to such 
a set. But the structure of their totality is uniquely determined, “invariant” as Dedekind said. 
Otherwise put, the choice of representatives is arbitrary, but the general structure (or “concept”, 
to use the terminology of Hilbert and Dedekind) is not at all.46   
 Thus Frege’s mathematical ontology is quite demanding, taking talk of mathematical objects 
in a very strict sense, which gives it a certain metaphysical ‘thickness’. It deserves to be 
mentioned that he shared Kant’s views on existence, denying that mere logical consistency 
could be a sufficient basis for existence – in sharp contrast to Hilbert and Dedekind, who on this 
matter were essentially on a par. The mathematical ontology of Dedekind (and Hilbert) is more 
flexible and tends to be non-metaphysical, since it is all a matter of potentialities (logical 
possibilities) rather than actualities. Hence its metaphysical ‘lightness’. 
 In the case of Dedekind logic and pure mathematics, rather than a theory of a priori objects, 
would be a theory of a priori structures. (Naturally, he would not have used this clarifying 
word, but perhaps “concepts”; and he would consider related “objects”, which however in his 
approach are merely possible objects of thought.) According to Dedekind, and as we saw above 
in Kantian spirit, two things must exist as a consequence of the pure laws of logic: one called 
the Self, another called the thought-world (Gedankenwelt). But no other existential assumption 
is required to prove that there is a simply infinite set (he believed in 1888), hence to prove that 
the set N of natural numbers exists – nor, he assumed, to show the existence of the set R of real 
numbers or the set C of complex numbers. The argument presented by Dedekind for such claims 
works purely at the conceptual level, at the level of logical possibilities, and carefully avoids 
concrete assumptions about the existence of particular things (other than the two just 
mentioned) or of anything empirical.  
 To summarize, these differences emphasize a half epistemic, half metaphysical point on 
which Frege and Russell were close, while Dedekind was not. The disparities make clear that 
there were different brands of logicism, and that logicism does not necessarily lead to 
                                                       
46 This is related to the centrality of categoricity results in Dedekind’s work. See Reck (2003), Awodey 
& Reck (2002). 
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singularism or “essentialistic objectualism”. This difference was very important 
philosophically,47 but it does not affect the issue whether Dedekind’s basic principles qualify as 
logicistic or not. Taking into account also the work of other authors, I would suggest that there 
were two influential brands of logicism in 1900: one might be called singular logicism and is 
represented by Frege, being characterized by an intensionalist view of logic and by singularism 
in the above sense; the other might be called structural logicism and is represented by 
Dedekind, Hilbert, and to some extent Schröder, being characterized by an extensional 
conception of logic and by structuralism (which includes a “deflationary” view of mathematical 
ontology). 
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